The Long View : An apparent consensus
Manuel L. Quezon III
Inquirer News Service
THE PERCENTAGE of Filipinos who want Charter change would have been enough to elect Fidel V. Ramos but not enough to elect Joseph Estrada. That's pretty pathetic. But it also, perhaps, explains why many supporters of Charter change, as proposed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, Speaker Jose de Venecia and former President Ramos, come from the ranks of Lakas-CMD party: They're the same people who voted Ramos into office in 1992.
The latest Social Weather Stations (SWS) survey, which took place before the President's State of the Nation Address, shows that 30 percent of Filipinos want Charter change. That's 10 percent better than the 20 percent of Filipinos who favored Cha-cha in 2003. If the figures keep growing at that rate, we can look forward to a national consensus either by 2009, when at least 50 percent of Filipinos will be in favor of Charter change; or better yet, to 2011, when perhaps 60 percent of Filipinos, an incontestable majority, will finally want it.
But for now, 70 percent of the country is content with the present Constitution. That's an almost impregnable majority.
The SWS says the Visayas is 40 percent in favor of Charter change. This still leaves a formidable majority of 60 percent against. Mindanao is even more opposed to constitutional changes than Luzon or the Visayas: Only 19 percent of the people in that island want constitutional change.
As I suggested in a previous column, there may be grounds to think that federalism is an idea to which more people might be open: 34 percent of Filipinos are agreeable to it; 28 percent are against; the undecided on the issue (34 percent) are as many as those already open to the idea. Still, the survey, which is only a snapshot in time, suggests that a national consensus exists: for the presidential, unitary and bicameral system of government.
This means that it is wrong to say there is a groundswell, anywhere in the nation, for federalism, or parliamentarism, or unicameralism. What there is, in fact, is more of an openness to exploring these concepts; but "openness" is far different from enthusiastic -- or even grudging -- "acceptance." This means our political leadership runs the risks of being out of synch with the people's sentiments, though, of course, the consequences of being held accountable for going against public opinion is next to nothing.
Rush the constitutional amendment now through Congress, and rush a referendum next year for its ratification. The advantage will be with the political parties, which have the machinery needed to get their followers to vote for a new constitution and prevent the recording of votes opposed to a new charter. In fact, there might be little need for vote-rigging since, historically, Filipinos aren't so eager about participating in referendums on constitutional amendments.
Another interesting finding of the survey is that the A, B and C classes are consistently the most interested in changing constitutional provisions. This points to the larger agenda for this exercise, which is the elimination of the so-called "masa" [masses'] vote (which is difficult to control) at least on a national basis. This means Cha-cha is a reactionary exercise in that it seeks to negate what already exists. And what exists? A democracy in which the public cannot relate to either the rhetoric or the priorities of the professional political class. This means the class finds itself threatened by more accomplished communicators who are high on charisma but low on either integrity or depth, depending on which part of the professional political circles you talk to.
Our public and our professionals made the bed they now refuse to lie in. They talk of the dangers of popularity and of weakened political parties, when they (or to be precise, their ancestors) dismantled the safeguards against both popularity and the deterioration of party government. My first columns for this newspaper explained how popularity began to trump party control: through the elimination of bloc voting, which was attacked as "undemocratic." The removal of bloc voting eliminated the institutional means for enforcing both party loyalty and party discipline.
The other flaws of the present system come about when those without political experience define our political rules. The decision to encourage a multiparty system, without run-off elections to ensure solid majorities for the winners of national contests, was the gravest mistake of all. It condemned the country to elections in which there is no incentive for self-discipline on the part of candidates, or coalition-building on the part of factions or parties. Since even a minority winner can take all, there's no need to think ahead with regard to the consequences of holding an office that has traditionally relied on broad national mandates. I can't say it often enough: percentage-wise (which is the only number system that counts in elections), the most uncharismatic president of the Third Republic, obtained a higher percentage of the votes than the most popular president of the Fifth Republic -- Carlos Garcia got 41.3 percent; Estrada got 39.6 percent.
Now, since it seems achieving a national consensus is more in keeping with the consensus that exists among the political parties (Charter change, Ramos-style, after all, is not just a Lakas-CMD affair, but rather, a group effort involving the Liberals, the Nacionalistas, the Nationalist People's Coalition, which is really the Nacionalista Party-Cojuangco Wing, and so on), then our energies should be devoted to trying to convince the public that the political parties should get what they desire. As it is, it seems to me that the public is, indeed, extremely institutional in its orientation. It likes having a presidency, for example, even if it doesn't like the President.
